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GRAY V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO.

[Sac. No. 5620.

LD

Bank.

[23 C.2d

Feb. I, 1944.]

MARY ELLEN GRAY, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant,
v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation)
R~oo~~
,
[la-Ic]. Master and ~ervant-Federal Employers' Liability ActEVldence-Sufficlency.-In an action under the 11'ederal E ployers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A., §§ 51-59) for thl' de::b
o~ a brakeman whos~ severed arm and body were found respectively under the thlrty-fifth and fortieth cars of defendant's
SIXt~-two car freight train after it came to a stop shortly after
~ullIng out fron;'- a station, the evidence would support an
mference or findmg that the brakeman was on the thirty-fifth
car. and that the stopping of the train was the cause of the
a.ccIdent, where the train traveled five car lenO"ths from the
time of the application of air brakes and the :top i where it
w~s the brakeman's custom and practice to inspect the first
thIrty-four to. thirty-five cars from the ground, and then to
board the tram at that point i and where be was an experienced and a~le workman, and was familiar both with the
tracks and wIth the character of the train involved.
~ I

ii'I
"

'i

:i
"

1

[2a, 2b] Id.-Fe~eral Employers' Liability Act-Questions of Fact.
-In an actIOn under the l!'ederal Employers' Liability Act
for the dea~h of a brakeman, where there was evidence to
su~port an mference or finding that the brakeman was on the
thIrty-fifth .car .of defendant's freight train and that there
wa~ a defimte lInk of causation between the stopping of the
tram and the brakeman's fall from said car, evidence that
the brakeman fell, before the stop, from the second or fourth
car, that blood was found on the wheels of the second to the
fifth .cars! and .that the brakeman's duties did not include
a rollm.g ll~spectIon ?f the first thirty-five cars, merely created
a . confilCt m the e~Idence or involved the credibility of the
wItn~sses or the . weIght of the evidence, and were matters for
the JUry to conSIder.
[3a,

3~]. ~d.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Evidence-Admisslblbty.-In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act for the death of a brakeman, evidence of a former railro.ad employee of defendant, testifying in plaintiff's behalf
WIth regard to the duties of a head braKeman such as the
deceased, that four years prior to the accide~t it was the

McK. Dig. References: [1, 6J Master and Servant, § 204(5) .
[2] Ma~ter and Servant, § 204(6); [3] Master and Servant'
§ 204(4) , [4J Appeal and Error, §106Sj [5] Evidence §§555(1/
563; [7] Evidence, § 525; [8] Appeal and Error, § 1094.
'
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brakeman's practice and custom, when a freight train pulled
out of a station, to inspect the first thirty-five cars from thE.'
ground, was admissible and relevant, where defendant's fireman testified that, whatever the practice might have been four
years previously, it remained the same thereafter, and where
defendant's written rules were consistent with the cor..struction that brakemen generally were required to make a rolling
inspection and pass signals.
[4] Appeal- Persons Urging Errors - Respondent. - Generally,
a respondent may not be heard on appeal to complaiN of the·
improper admission of evidence.
[5] Evidence-Province to Determine Oredibility: Weight of Oircumstantial Evidence.-It is the province of the jury to disbelieve any testimony which appears to them to lack verit].
They may reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial
evidence as proof of the facts.
[6a, 6b] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability ActEvidence-Sufficiency.-In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of a brakeman, the evidence supported an implied finding of the jury t.h at the brakeman was thrown from a freight train as a result of defendant's negligence in stopping the train shortly after it pulled
out from a station, where such a stop. was not a common
occurrence and there was nothing to indicate that the brakeman was aware that a stop was going to be made, where the
stop was not for any emergency and the block signal showed
a clear track ahead, where no notice or warning of the stop
was given, and where, in view of the brakeman's practice to
making a rolling inspection of the train and board about the
thirty-fifth car, the engineer should have known that the
brakeman in the course of his ddies was on top of the train
at the time it was stopped.
[7] Evidence.-Opinion Evidence-Operation of Trl'ins.-In an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the
death of a brakeman, a former railroad man of many years'
experience as a brakeman and conductor was qualified to
testify as an expert what would be the action of a ear in the
middle of a 62-car train, moving out from a station not faster
than eight miles an hour, if the train were brought to a stop
within five car lengths by any application of the automatic
air throughout the train.
[8] Appeal- Persons Urging Errors - Invited Error - Evidence
Excluded.-A party may not on appeal object to Ii judgment

141 Rce 2 Oal.Jur. 839, 840 j 3 Am.Jur. 403.
[8] See 2 Oal.Jur. 846, 847; 3 Am.Jur. 430.
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against him because of insufficient evidentiary support where
such. l~ck arose as a result of improper exclusion of e~idence
at hIS mstance.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Placer County. Raymond McIntosh, Judge assigned. Reversed with directions.
Action under the Federal Employers I Liability Act for
damages for wrongful death of a brakeman. Judgment for
defendant, notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff reversed
with directions.
'
. M. Mitchell Bourquin, Patrick J. Murphy and K. D . .Robmson for Appellant.
T. L. Chamberlain and Jones & Quinn for Respondent.
. CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant ~otwithstanding the verdict of a jury awarding her
damages In the sum of $15,000 in an action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, (45 U.S.C.A", secs. 51-59) based
~pon the alleged negligence of defendant in the operation of
Its train ~es~lting in the death of Pierce L. Gray.
. The ~aIn Issue presented is whether or not the evidence
IS suffiCIent to sup~ort the implied finding of the jury that
the deceased met hIS death in the course of his employment
\ as the result of defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's theory is
tha: t~e deceased was knocked from the top of a box car
whilc In. the performance of his duties as a brakeman by
the neglIgent stopping of the train without warning.
[l~J Defendant operates a railroad through Colfax, Califor~Ia. On the evening of April 10, 1934, the time of the
acc~dent, d.efenda~t. was operating in inteMltate commerce a
freIght tram COnsIstIng of two engines, sixty-two cars, and a
caboose, en route easterly from Roseville, California, through
Colfax .to Sparks, Nevada. One engine was at the head of
the traIn, and the other, a helper, four cars ahead of the
cab~ose. Thc first thirty-five cars following the head locomotive ~ere b?x cars. At Colfax the facilities for supplying
the. engmes WIth water are located on the south side of the
ma~n t.r llck ab~ut 20 feet f'ast of an express company shed
WhICh In turn IS about IOU feet east of the depot. Th~ train
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arrived at Colfax at 9 :45 at night; the weather was clear,
the night was dark and it was dry and warm .. In stopping
to take on water, the lead engine was uncoupled and proceeded 8.lbout 100 feet to the water column. The watering
operations were completed, and at 10 p. m. the train pulled
out of Colfax. After it had proceeded 40 to 50 car lengths
and attained a speed of about eight miles per hour, it was
brought to a stop by the engineer in the lead engine by the
application of air throughout the train. The train traveled'
about· 250 feet or about five car lengths from the time the
air brakes were applied before it stopped. Following the
stop, deceased was found dead, his head and left forearm
having been scvered from his body. His body was found at
about the fortieth car from the head of the train;' his forearm was found leaning against the inside of the south rail
of the tracks under the thirty-fifth car. There thus were
five cars betwecn his body and arm, or the same distance
that the train traveled from the time of the application of
the brakes to the stop.. From the leaning position of the
forearm it is reasonable to infer that no wheel of the train
passed over the place where the arm was lying after it reached
that position inasmuch as the £lange on the wheel would have
moved it. From these circumstances it may be dednced that
the deceased was at the thirty-fifth car from the head of the
train at the time of the occurrence of the event that caused
his death and it is probable that the deceased's nrm had
been dragged along by the thirty-fifth car until the train
came to a full stop. Moreover, other circumstances place him·
at that point and also indicate that he had boarded the train.
There were four brakemen on the train, one of whom, the
head brakeman, was the deceased. At and. before the time
of the accident it was the deceased's duty . togo' upon 'and
walk along and over moving freight cars. There is evidence
that the custom or practice was for the head brakeman, under
the circumstances presented, to inspect the first half, or the
first thirty-four to thirty-five cars of the train from the
ground as it rolled out of the station, giving special attention
to whether the brakes were sticking on the wheels of any
of the cars or whether any wheels were sliding. After the
portion of the train subject to his inspection had rolled past,
he would board the train, going on top of the cars to give
lIr receive signals. It is wholly reasonable to conclude that
on the occasion in question the decedent Wal> performing

I
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those duties, had inspected his portion of the train and
boarded the thirty-fifth car. That conclusion is consistent
with evidence which is susceptible of the interpretation that
the maximum speed of eight miles per hour for a train pulling out of a station is designed to enable trainmen who are
making a rolling inspection from the ground to board the
train after completion of that duty. Also, the evidence shows
that deceased was characterized as an excellent brakeman.
always ",Villing to do his part and was active and competent,
hence, bkely to be performing his duties. The foregoing
circumstances are sufficient to place decedent on the thirty.
fifth car and sustain the inference that he fell from that car.
With reference to the presence of deceased on the train,
without regard to the particular portion thereof defendant
admits in its answer that at the time of the ~ccident deceased was on the top of one of the freight cars of the train
in the course of his employment and that he was run over
b?the train.. Thus, if the defendant was negligent in stoppmg the tram and that negligence was the proximate cause
o~ his death, there is sufficient evidence to support the verdICt. The foregoing circumstances clearly furnish a basis
for concluding that the stopping of the train was the cause
of the a~cident, par~i~ularly the location of the body and
the 10.catIOn and pOSItIOn of the forearm. They reasonably
estahlIsh as a fact that the accident occurred while the train
was in the process of stopping.
[2a] Defendant contends that the only substantial evidence Supports its version of the accident, that is, that de.
ceased fell before the stop from the top of the second or
fourth car behind the lead engine while crossing without a
lantern from one car to another en route to the engine and
hence no asserted negligen~e of defendant in making the stop
could have caused the aCCIdent. It points to evidence that
when the train arrived in Colfax to take on water the de.
ceased assisted in that operation by uncoupling and later
Coupling the lead engine; that he left a restaurant near the
t:acks when the train was starting and the engine crew testIfied that he boarded and moved to the top of the second or
fourth car from the lead engine, having no lantern with him.
that blood was found on the wheels of the second to fifth
car~; that all. the witnesses who qualifiedly testified on the
sub.loct. establIshed that the deceased's duties as head brakeman dId not include a roiling inspection or the train and
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that he was supposed to board and ride the lead engine when
it left Colfax.
The most that can be said of such eviden~e is th~t. cre·
ated a conflict in the evidence or involved the credIbIhty of
the witnesses or the weight of the evidence, all matters
which were resolved against defendant by the jury and with
which we are not concerned on appeal. [lb] In addition to
the circumstances heretofore related as supporting the jury's
verdict there are other circumstances which mitigate against
defend~nt 's version of the accident. Although it was a dark
night the weather was warm and dry and as far as appears
the cars were in /tood condition. Deceased was a brakeman
of many years' experience, was an alert, agile and able workman, a~d the tracks traversed were in g~od condition and
decedent was familiar with them and the character of the
train involved. All of th('se circumstances carry inferences
which rebut the assumption that deceased fell when going
from the top of one car to another without the intervention
of any unusual occurrence.
It must be remembered that practically all of the witnesses were employees of the defendant and thus cannot
be said to be disinterested witnesses. With reference to the
duty of decedent to make a rolling inspection of the fore part
of the train it is true that Reveral of defendant's employees
testified that the head brakeman had no such duties at the
time of the accident with respect to any part of the train.
The jury could have disbelieved those witnesses. One of
them testified that there was no rule prohibiting a head brakeman from riding on top of the train, that is, that it was not
mandatory that he ride in the cab of the engine. Another
stated it was up to the brakeman whether he rode on top
of the train rather than in the engine cab. The conductor
on the train testified that he observed a brakeman near the
head of the train when it was moving out and a rolling inspection was made. He stated that it was Hatch, another
brakeman not Gray. But although Hatch stated on direct
examinati~n that he had made a rolling inspection of the
whole train, his testimony in this regard was substantially
impeached by inferences which may be drawn from other
evidence. From his testimony on direct examination it may
be inferred that he stood or squatted in one spot near the
rails and watched the wheels of every car of the entire train

i:
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as it passed him. But it is established that the train com.
prised two engines, 62 cars and the caboose, that it had rolled
only 40 to 50 car lengths when the airbrakes were suddenly
applied for the irregular stop, and that it rolled only about
five car lengths more before its complete stop. Therefore, from
45 to 55 car lengths was as far as the train moved at the
time in question. It did not move its entire length. At
least seven cars plus the helper engine plus the caboose had
not yet passed Hatch when the train had come to a full stop
if he started his inspection at the first car. But he said he
boarded the caboose and that this was done while the train
was stilI in motion. If that part of his testimony is true
then it seems to be a reasonable inference that he was not
the, brakeman who inspected the front part of the train. It
is therefore reasonable to conclude that the brakeman mak.
ing the rolling inspection of the fore part of the train was
deceas~d, not Hatch, the other members of the crew being
otherWISe engaged. [Sa] Plaintiff produced a witness Wait
whose credibility is vigorously attacked by defendant wh~
testified with regard to the duties of a head brakema~ such
as deceased to make a rolling inspection under the given cir.
cumstr.nces. His testimony cannot be said to have been de.
stroy~d. He was a former railroad man of many years'
experIence as a brakeman and otherwise, and had experience
prior to the date of tho accident on the run here in question
havinf.! been an employee of defendant. He testified that
was the practice and custom for the head brakeman to make
a :olling inspection under the circumstances here presented
prIOr to 1930, four years before the accident. Defendant's
firem~n on the lead engine testified that the practice had
remaIned the same during many years prior to 1930 and'
thereafter. However, his view of the practice was contrary
~o .Wait's. The question of credibility was for the jury and
It IS unnecessary to discuss in detail the various attacks UpOl1
~t made by defendant. . It is contended, however, that it was
Improperly admitted because there was no foundation laid
establishing that the practice was the same in 1930 as in 1934
~he da~ of. the accident; that the fireman's testimony wa~
InSUffiCIent In that respect because he testified to a contrary
custom. [4] Generally, the respondent may not be heard on
appeal to complain of the improper admission of evidence.
(See 2 Cal.Jur. 839-840.) [Sb] Nevertheless, we believe that
thc evidence was admissible and relevant under the circum-

it
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stances in the instant case. Wait had many years' railroad
experience and had experience as a brakeman in the op~ra
tion of trains at the place involved in the instant actIon.
Although the fireman testified that the practice imposed no
duty of rolling inspection on the head brakeman, he also testified : "Q. Then you may be understood to ~ay that the
practice in 1934 was the same as '33, '32, '29, rIght o~ back
through your experience? A. Yes, sir. Q. Whatever 1.1 was,
it was the same? A. Yes sir." (Emphasis added.) The
jury could have disregarded the fireman 's testi~ony as to
the exact practice, and accepted the part that It wa~ the
same prior to 1930 as it was at the time of the acc~dent.
Moreover the written rules of the company may be Inter·
preted a~ consistent with the requirement that brake~en
generally, not referring to any particular. one, are reqUIred
to make It rolling inspection and pass SIgnals. . The ru~es
'limit the speed of trains to eight miles per hour f?r a dI~
tance to permit a rolling inspection and each tramman 18
responsible for the wheels of the portion of the train und?r
his charge. Trainmen must be so distributed over the t:am
"as to ('.Ontrol it most effectively." The fireman testIfied
that it is n brakeman's duty to be in a position to pass signals
while a train is in motion.
[2b] In regard to the location and position of ,decedent's
arm in relation to the thirty-firth car and .the presence of
decedent's body at the rortieth car from the head of the train,
the evidence referred to by defendant does nothing more than
create a conflict. Although there may be some conflict in
the fireman's testimony or uncertainty in its me~ning, he
testified that he walked back ftom the lead engine along the
south side of the train 15 to 20 cars, then seeing a lantern
on the north side crossed over and continued to theStaIldard
Oil crossing, where he fonnd the arm. He then 'stated, which
in the light of his foregoing testimony may be said to ~ean!
that the arm and the Standard Oil crossing were at the thirty.
fifth car from the engine: ' I Q. Did you then walk back to
the Standard Oil CrossingY A. Yes. Q. It was then that
you found the arm of Pierce Gray Y A. Yes sir. Q. How
many cars was that back from the Standard Oil Crossing'
A.. I should judge about 35." That interpretation is fur·
ther fortified by the fireman's testimony that he did not
proceed beyond the Standard Oil crossing, but returned to
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the lead engine after finding the arm. Moreover, there is
evidence that the helper engine, when the train was stopped,
was on the Grass Valley grade crossing, and with it in that
position, considering the make-up of the train and the distance between the Standard Oil crossing, where the arm was
found, and the Grass Valley crossing, the thirty-fifth car
would be resting at the former crossing. The position of the
arm with respect to the south rail of the track, that position
being such that no wheel of the car could have passed by it
without moving it is clearly shown by the evidence. The
conductor testified at the trial that the CCarm was laying
up on the, on this fill, up against the right rail of the number
two track, that is the main line track. Q. Which rail was
that, the right rail Y A. The right rail, yes sir." He was
called as plaintiff's witness and was impeached because of
surprise by plaintiff by his testimony at the coroner's inquest. Nevertheless, he admitted he testified at the inquest:
"
C Do you recall which arm and hand was found at the crossing? A. I believe it was the left. Q. That was found in
between the rails, was it? A. Yes, leaning up against the
right rail.' Did you so testify at the coroner's inquest Y A. I
believe I did, yes .. " Mr. Bourquin: Q. Will you answer,
Mr. Lytle, was that true, when you gave that testimony at
the inquest? A. I told it for the truth, yes sir." The fireman testified: ceQ. Whereabouts was the arm that you saw
with respect to the rails upon which you were travellingf
A. It was on the south rail, just inside where the flange
tread, laying up against the rail where the flange tread was. "
That testimony wa.."l clearly susceptible of the interpretation
by the jury that the arm was in the position heretofore described. There is conflicting evidence by the same witness
on the subject, but its credibility and the conclusion to be
drawn therefrom was for the jury.
The evidence of blood spots on the wheels heretofore
referred to is asserted as substantiating defendant's theory
and completely refuting plaintiff's version. The spots claimed
to have been discovered by the conductor on his first inspection of the fifth car' were very small and a later inspection
was not made until after the train reached Nevada. Defendant also calls attention to the fact that Gray's lantern was
not found, but this was another circumstance for the jury
to consider in the determination of the issues of fact.
[5] In determining the disputed questions of fact pre-

sented at the trial of the case it was the province of the jury
to disbelieve any testimony which appeared to theI?- :~ lack
verity. They were the exclusivc judges of the ~redlbI!Ity of
the witnesses and the weight to be given theIr testimony.
They could reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial evidence as proof of the facts, as it is eleme~tary that
direct evidence may be disbelieved and contra:y Clrcums~an
tial evidence relied upon to support a verdIct or findmg.
(Barha.m v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173] ; Parsons v.
Easton 184 Cal. 764 [195 P. 419].)
[10]' The foregoing discussion has t~ do with the m.ann~r
and place in which the deceased met hIS death. There IS eVIdence from which an inference may be drawn that he .was on
the thirty-fifth car, and that he fell therefrom some tIme between the application of the brakes and the stop, and that .
there was a definite link of causation between the stop and
the fall. [6a] It remains then to determine whether
not
defendant was negligent in making the stop, and hence hable.
There is considerable discussion in regard to ,...hether the
stop was unusual. It is defendant's claim that the stop was
made to ascertain the whereabouts of the deceased. There
is evidence that such a stop was not a common occurrence
and certainly it was not to be expeC'tcJ ~t least .as ~ar as the
deceascd was concerned. 'l'ltcre is notblllg' to mdleatc that
hc was aware that a stop was going' to be made. The ntop
was not for any emergency. 'rhe blocl;: signal showeJ a clear
track ahead. The engineer testified that: "Q. Gave .you a
clear signal, and you got a denr signal from th<.~ block Signal?
A. Yes. Q. In other words from thc time yon p!l.ss~d tho
block signal, you had no rcason to expect any necc:;sIty to
stop is that the inea Y A. Y ps. " Hatch, a brakeman, tp~
tified: "Q. Mr. Hatch, you boarded the train leaving Colfax on the caboose, is that right Y A. What is that Y Q.
When the train started up at Colfax, did you board on the
cabooseY A. yes.... Q. Mr. Hatch, after the train ~ad
stopped at Colfax and taken water and made preparatIOns
to leave, you, as brakeman, didn't expect that any stop woul~
be made pulling out of there, did you 7 A. No, not ordInarily. . .. Q. Mr. Hatch, the fact that a ~rain did stop at
the plaee thiS was brought to a stop, lcavlllg Colfax that
night after the train had stopped at Colfax and taken water

0:
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and prepared to move on, was an unusual thing, wasn't it T
A. Yes, ordinarily, it was." No notice or warning of the
stop was given. A rule of the defendant referring ~o the
various whistle signals indicates a short blast" apply brakes,
stop. " One of the crew testified that that meant: "Long,
short blast of the whistle sounded by the engineer, signifying to the trainmen that he wants help to stop the train with,
that for some reason that the air brakes on the train have
come partially or wholly in-operative, and that he is not able
to control the speed of the train, or to stop the train as he
wants to, and needs help." While the reference is to assistance in stopping the tra.in, nevertheless it would also serve
as a warning that a stop was to be made. The engineer on
the helper engine stated that one short blast of the whistle
on the lead engine means a stop and indicates the intention
of the engineer to stop the train. Wait testified that he was
familiar with the above mentioned rule and that upon a short
blast of the whistle the train crew prepared for a stop. Defen.
dant admitted in its answer that decedent was in the course
of his duties on top of the train at the time of the accident,
and as we have <:Ieen according to its version he was On the
fourth car when the train started. In view of the custom
and practice requiring the deceased to make a rolling inspection of the train and board about the thirty-fifth car,
the engineer in the lead engine should have known that the
deceased in the course of his duties was on top of the train
at the time it was stopped. Those circumstances also negative the reason advanced by the engineer for the stop, that
is, that it was due to the absence of deceased from the cab
of the lead engine. While there is evidence by several witnesses that the stop was gradual and easy and without a jerk
in the cars there are circumstances from which the jury could
have inferred that the stop would probably have caused some
jolting. Before the stop practically all of the slack between
the cars had been taken up. Although there is evidence that
the proper application of the air brake.'l throughout the train
results in a uniform braking to avoid jerking, the element of
the slack resulting from stopping is an element to be considered. An application of air at a slow speed creates a greater
shock than at high speed. The train was traveling about
eight miles per hour. The helper engine four cars ahead
. of the caboose was pushing forward to some extent. There
is evidence that a slight rather than a proper application of
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llir throughout the train as welJ as an independent applica·
tion in the lead engine alone would cause a jolting and jerking. The flagman in the caboose testified that the stop was
smooth without any jerking, but he also stated that the brakes
were set up lightly and gently. Deceased was an able and
active brakeman not likely to fall from the top of the car
unless something unusual happened. Wait, a brakeman and
conductor of many years' experience, including experience.
on the run here involved, testified as an expert: "Q. Mr.
Wait, what would be the action upon a car in the middle of
a 62 car train moving out from the stop at Colfax not faster
than eight miles an hour, with the slack stretched out fo~ a
considerable distance behind the leading engine, and wlth
the helper engine pushing slightly_ working steam, if that
train were brought to a stop within five car lengths, or 250
feet, by any application or use of the automatic air throughout the train? . _ . A. It would be an awful jar, I'll tell
you. It would be enough to throw a man from a box car,
knock his feet out from under him. Mr. Jones: We move
to strike out everything after the words 'it would be an
awful jar'; the rest of it is going into the realm of specula.tion and conclusion again. The Court: Very well, it mil:,
go out." (Emphasis added.) From the foregoing evidence
it is clear that it could be concluded that defendant was
negligent in the process of making the stop and that that
negligence caused the death of decedent.
[7] Defendant asserts, however, that the foregoing testimony of Wait cannot be considered by this court.. Clearly
Wait was qualified to testify as an expert from. hIS many
years' experience. The matter concer~hig which. ~e tes:ifi:d
was a proper subject for expert testimony. It Is.sa}d m
Peters v. Southern Pacific 00., 160 Cal. 48, 66 [116 P ..400] :
"The management and operation of trains is a matter outRide the experience and kn~wledge of ordina~y juro;,s,. an.d
it is, therefore, a proper subJect for expert testlmony.
ThlS
court held in the recent case of Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. 00., 21 Ca1.2d 308 [131 P.2d 535], that the effect
a loose condition would have upon the operation of a brake
on a train was the proper subject of expert testimony_ The
question put to Wait included sufficient facts which were
established upon which to base his opinion. It does not
appcar that the brakes on the train in 1934, the date of the.
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accident, were any different from those in use during Wait's
experience prior to 1930.
[8] Upon defendant's motion the foregoing testimony
of ~ait was stricken from the record. Nevertheless, defenant IS not now in a position to complain of its consideration
on this appeal in support of the verdict. A party may not
object to a judgment against hi:n because of insufficient evidentiary support where such lack arose as the result of the
improper exclusion of evidence at his instance. It is so held
where one party appeals from a judgment urging insufficiency
of the evidence to support it. If the evidence necessary to
support the judgment was erroneously excluded at the instance of appellant the judgment will be nevertheless affirmed.
(Kelso v. Slosburg, 120 Cal.App. 479 [8 P.2d 158] ; Crinella
v. Northwestern Pac. R. R. Co., 85 Cal.App. 440 [259 P. 774] ;
Truschel v. Rex Amusement Co., 102 W. Va. 215 [136 S.E.
30]; Missouri, K. &; T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 102 F. 96
[42 C.C.A. 188]; see 3 Am.Jur. Appeal & Error, sec.
879; 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error, sec. 1506; 2 Cal.Jur.
846-847; Chamberlain Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 51
Cal.App.2d 520 [125 P.2d 113]; Martin v. Postal Union
Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 570 [61 P.2d 333] . Hansen v.
California Bank, 17 Cal.App.2d 80 [61 P.2d 794] ; Ralph v.
Anderson, 187 Cal. 45 [200 P. 940] ; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.
App. 137 [256 P. 484] ; Credit C. Bureau v. Guaranty L. Co.,
61 Cal.App. 528 [215 P. 104] ; Harp v. Harp, 136 Cal. 421
[69 P. 28].) [6b] Under the circumstances we think it is
clear that the jury was justified in concluding that defendant
was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.
On January 17, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United
States render cd its decision in the case of Tennant v. Peoria
and Pekin Union Railway Company, in which decision the
function of the court and jury in the trial of a case arising
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is discussed.
The court said:
"In order to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that
respondent was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause in whole or in part of the fatal accident.
(Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67 [63
S.Ot. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967].) Petitioner was
required to present probative facts from which the negligence

and the causal relation could reasonably be inferred. 'The
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed
to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance
for all reasonably possible inf·erences favoring the party
whose case is attacked.' (Galloway Vi United States, 319
U.S. 372, 395 [63 S.Ot. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458]; Atchison,
Topeka &; Santa Fe R. Co. v. Toops, 281 U.S. 351 [50 S.Ot.
281, 74 L.Ed. 896].) If that requirement is met as we believe it was in this case, the issues may properly b~ presented
to t~e jury. No court is then justified in substituting its conclUSIOns for those of the twelve jurors....
"The court below erred, however, in holding that there
was not sufficient proof to support the charge that respondent's negligence in failing to ring the bell was the proximate cause of Tennant's death. The absence of eyewitnesses'
was not decisive. There was testimony that his duties included staying near the north or rear end of the engine as
it made its backward movement out of track B-28. The location of his severed hand, cap, lantern and the pool of blood
was strong e,,-idence that he was killed approximately at the
point where the engine began this backward movement and
where he might have been located in the performance of his
duties. To this evidence must be added the presumption that
the deceased was actually engaged in the performance of
those. duties ~nd exercised due care for his own safety at
the tIme of hIS death. (Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 200
U.S. 480, 488 [26 S.Ot. 303, 50 L.Ed. 564] ; Atchison, Topeka
&; Santa Fe R. Co. v. Toops, supra, 356; New Aetna Portland
Cement Co. v. Hatt, 231 F. 611, 617 [145 C.C.A. 497].) In
additioll, the evidence relating to the rule and custom of
ringing a bell 'when an engine is about to move' warranted
a finding that Tennant was entitlcd to rely on such a warning under these circumstances. The ultimate inference that
Tennant would not have been killed but for the failure to
w~rn him is therefore supportable. The ringing of the bell
mIght well have saved his life. The jury could thus find
that respondent was liable 'for ... death resulting in whole
or,!n part f~om the negligence of any of the ... employees.'
In holdmg that there was no evidence upon which to
base the jury's inference as to causation, the court below
e~p~asize~ other inferences which are suggested by the conflictmg eVIdence. Thus it was said to be unreasonable to
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assume that Tennant was standing on the track north of the
engine in the performance of his duties. It seemed more
probable to the court that he seated himself on the footboard
of the engine and fell asleep. Or he may have walked back
unnoticed to a point south of the engine and been killed
while trying to climb through the cars to the other side of
the track.
These and other possibilities suggested by
diligent counsel for respondent all suffer from the same lack
of direct proof as characterizes the one adopted b~.. the jury.
But to the extent that they involve a disobedience of duty
by Tennant no presumption in their favor exists. Nor can
any possible assumption of risk or contributory negligence
on Tennant's part be presumed in order to negate an inference that death was due to respondent's negligence.
"It is not the function of a court to search the record
for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the
ca.se away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives
equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The
focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the
particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is
the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It
weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the
credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and
draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very
essence of its function is to select from among conflicting
inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. (Washington &- Georgetown R. 00. v. McDade, 135
U.S. 554, 571, 572 [10 S.Ct. 1044, 34 L.Ed. 235] ; Tiller v.
Atlantic Ooast Line R. 00., sttpra, 68; Bailey v. Oentral Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 353, 354 [63 S.Ct. 1062, 87 L.Ed.
1444].) That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence,
causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored.
Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside
the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn
different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that
other results are more ree,sonable.
"Upon an examination of the record we cannot say that
the inference drawn by this jury that respondent's negligence
caused the fatal accident is without support in the evidence.
Thus to enter a judgment for respondent notwithstanding
the verdict is to deprive petitioner of the right to a jury
trial. No reason is apparent why we should abdicate our
duty to protect and guard that right in this case. We accord-
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ingly reverse the judgment of the court below and remand
the case to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion."
The judgment is reversed and the court below is instructed
to enter judgment on the verdict.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is my opinion that the evi~
dence is insufficient to warrant a finding by a reasonable jury
that it is more probable than not that the deceased met his
death in the course of his employment as the result of defendant's negligence.
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F. SHEALOR, Respondent, v. CITY OF LODI et at,
Appellants.
[la, Ib] Police-Pensions-Construction of Statute.-The statute
of 1889 governing police relief and pensions (Stats. 1889, p.
56 j Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6012), is enabling legislation
authorizing a city to make provision for a relief or pensiolt
fund rather than a mandatory enactment creating one.
[2] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construe-,
tion.-If a statute is susceptible of two oonstructions, one of
which will render it constitutional and the other will render
it unconstitutional in whole or in part, or will' raise serious
and doubtful constitutional questions, such as the imposition of a tax on a municipality in violation of Const., art.
XI, § 12, the court will adopt that construction which, with·
out doing violence to the reasonable construction of the language used, will render the statute valid in its entirety, or
free from doubt as to its constitutionality.
[3] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-"'Decisions In.terpreting
Statute: Police-Pensions-Construction of Statute.-Administrative construction of an ambiguous statute will be accorded

[2] See 5 Ca1.Jur. 615j 11 Am.Jur. 725.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Police, § 22; [2] Constitutional Law,
§ 51 j (3] Administrative Law; Police, § 22.

